Perforce Puppet Enterprise Deserialization of Untrusted Data Vulnerability
TL;DR 📌
- Perforce Puppet Enterprise contains a deserialization of untrusted data vulnerability in Puppet’s report-processing code that allows a client with any CA-signed agent certificate to execute arbitrary code on the Puppet Server as the service user by submitting a report containing a crafted rich-data type through a PUT request. If the certificate authority automatically signs requests…
- Highest CVSS: 9.4 (Critical).
- Listed in CISA KEV (2026-11-17) — this is being exploited in the wild.
- Check the advisory for fixed releases — remediation detail is in the vendor link below.
- CVEs: CVE-2026-115731.
What it is
CVE-2026-115731 is a deserialisation of untrusted data flaw in Puppet’s report-processing code, as used by Puppet Server within Perforce Puppet Enterprise. The Puppet Server deserialises rich-data types submitted in agent reports, and a crafted object in that data causes arbitrary code execution on the server, running as the Puppet Server service user.
The access path runs through Puppet’s normal agent reporting mechanism: a client submits a report via a PUT request. The only requirement is that the client holds any CA-signed agent certificate — there is no requirement for the certificate to belong to a specific, trusted agent, just that it be signed by the CA the Puppet Server trusts.
This matters because many Puppet deployments configure the certificate authority to autosign certificate requests without strong verification. Where that’s the case, an attacker with no credentials and only network access to the CA can request and obtain a valid agent certificate, then use it to submit the malicious report and achieve code execution on the Puppet Server itself.
Given that Puppet Server typically manages configuration across an entire fleet, compromise of the server itself gives an attacker a position from which to affect every node it manages, as the agent certificate issue effectively replaces authentication with a network-reachable signing step. CVE-2026-115731 is in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue, added 2026-11-17, so it is known to be exploited.
What to do
- Check whether your certificate authority is configured to autosign agent certificate requests. If autosigning is enabled without additional verification (allowlists, manual approval, or policy-based checks), disable it or tighten it immediately — this is the step that turns the flaw from “requires a trusted cert” into “unauthenticated network attacker.”
- Restrict network reachability to the Puppet CA and Puppet Server’s report-submission endpoint (the PUT-based report path) to known agent networks only; do not expose certificate signing or report ingestion to untrusted or internet-facing segments.
- Review existing signed certificates for any issued to unexpected or unverified hosts, and revoke anything that can’t be accounted for.
- Consult the Perforce advisory for a fixed release — none is specified in the available CVE data at this time, so track vendor guidance directly rather than assuming a version number.
- Given the KEV listing, treat this as an active threat: prioritise the autosigning fix and network restrictions ahead of a patch cycle, since no fixed version is yet confirmed.
For leadership 🧭
Executive summary. Puppet Server, which typically configures an entire fleet of machines, can be taken over by a network attacker if the certificate authority autosigns agent certificates without verification. This is listed in CISA’s KEV catalogue as known to be exploited, so it needs immediate attention rather than waiting for the next patch cycle.
Why it matters:
- Puppet Server’s report-processing code deserialises rich-data types from agent PUT requests, and a crafted object in that data leads to arbitrary code execution as the service user.
- Exploitation only requires any CA-signed agent certificate, not one tied to a specific trusted host, so the normal agent trust model doesn’t stop it.
- Where the certificate authority autosigns requests without strong checks, an attacker with no credentials can obtain a valid certificate over the network and use it to compromise the server.
- Because Puppet Server manages configuration across an entire managed fleet, control of the server gives an attacker leverage over every node it administers.
Now / Next / Later:
- Now: Check whether your Puppet certificate authority autosigns agent certificate requests, and if so disable or tighten autosigning immediately with allowlists, manual approval, or policy-based checks.
- Next: Restrict network access to the Puppet CA’s signing endpoint and the Puppet Server’s report-submission PUT path to known agent segments only, and review existing signed certificates for any issued to unexpected hosts, revoking those you can’t account for.
- Later: Track Perforce’s advisory for a fixed release and apply it once confirmed, and build certificate issuance verification (rather than blanket autosigning) into standard Puppet CA deployment practice going forward.